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This essay responds to Martin Chanock's argument that race tainted
the entire enterprise of South African judging. It seeks to understand
how that could have been so, and looks to such driving forces as whites'
guilt, denial, identity-building, self-protection, and legitimation for
explanations. Then it asks whether an institution so tainted should
now be altogether abandoned as part of the rebuilding ofpost-apartheid
South Africa. The essay answers that much should be changed, but
that the existence of ajudiciary laying claim to a special expertise and
responsibility in interpreting law and protecting rights a key heritage
of the old South Africa's judicial system is an important safeguard
of liberty and should not be sacrificed.
Martin Chanock's book The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-
1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice (Chanock, 2001) is a deeply unsettling
volume. 1 What makes it unsettling is not, however, his demonstration that
brutal and arbitrary racial laws pervaded the old South Africa, nor his
careful reporting of a variety of decisions by the regular courts of South
Africa that accepted and gave effect to these unjust laws. It is not news
that South Africa was unjust, though it remains valuable to detail the
elements of that injustice. Rather, what is unsettling is Chanock's argu-
ment that race was at the heart of the entire enterprise of South African
judging, not only the regrettable decisions but even the admirable ones.
I want to begin by considering how this was so, as I am now inclined
to believe it was, though I will not seek to substantiate Chanock's account
(doing that is the subject of his book) so much as to illustrate and then
seek to explain it. Then I want to ask what should be done about it now,
in the process of state-making now underway - a process which aims,
centrally, to remove the taint of racism from South African life. I will
argue, in the end, that the heritage of racial injustice that is part of the
soil in which South African law has grown does not counsel in favour of
abandoning the institutions of law that have emerged from that past.
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How Pervasive Was the Role of Race in South African
Law?
We may begin very simply. As a matter of sheer mathematics it is implau-
sible to say that the core of law was pure, while only certain exceptional
areas were distorted by race. Race was too huge a portion of what law
was about. It is worth adding, though this is not an argument from sheer
quantity, that what the law did with race was too invidious not to echo
disturbingly elsewhere in the legal system. 2 Vast percentages of criminal
law arrests, for example, were for crimes focused on controlling Africans,
such as prohibition (116). Chanock also observes the shift in burden of
proof effected by statute 'precisely in those cases that affected a large
number of black rather than white accused' (122).
Civil law presented a similar picture. In delict or tort, the single great-
est source of workplace injury was the mines, where conditions amounted
to 'carnage'. Chanock writes that 'however conceptually advanced the
doctrines of the Roman-Dutch law were, most of the victims of negligence
in South Africa were not the beneficiaries of tort law, which offered them
no compensation and no protection' (189). At the same time, black workers
on the mines were subject to versions of contract that could not have been
further from an implementation of free choice. As Chanock writes:
In the single contract that affected more people than any other, the one
workers signed to work on the gold mines, the mine at which work was to
be done was not specified, nor was the range of duties, and nor were the
wages to be paid, which, in the standard contract, were to be 'at the ruling
current rate'. (173-4)
On the farms, meanwhile, Chanock observes that:
[P]erhaps the next most important contract in South African life in this
period was that between white landlord and African tenant farmer, and
again the realities seem to escape the conceptual world of the civil law. Of
the sharecropping agreements, Macmillan wrote that 'perhaps the main
characteristic of the system is the absence of any formal written agreement
or contract, this being also its greatest defect'. (175)
Black farm workers' lives were further regulated by the Native Service
Contract Act passed in 1932, which:
gave statutory effect to the idea that the household head contracted on
behalf of his whole household, adults and juveniles, who could all now be
bound by him to six months service each year. Breach by any household
member could result in the eviction of all. Lashes could be imposed for any
breach of the contract. Notionally using the instrument of contract, with its
aura of freedom of choice, the statute intensified coercion. (400)
(Or at least the statute would have had this effect if it had actually been
enforced (400, n 11)). Chanock observes that the 'purity of doctrine' of
South African contract and delict law:
coexisted with a state of affairs which mocked the jurisprudence developed,
which systemically denied compensation for the major areas of wrongful
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damage, and in which contracts were focused on the disciplining of racial
subordinates. (190)
But still it might be said that bad as law was in areas directly involv-
ing blacks or later directly involving political suppression, the law in these
fields did not usually spill over into other areas - and that that reflected
the judges' commitment to guarding the purity of doctrine, including
doctrine limiting state power, in those other areas. Since much of the law
of race and internal security was statutory law, it is also possible to argue
that when judges did not protect common law rights, they were acting
under the compulsion of a constitutionally supreme parliament. Chanock
offers illustrations of such interactions between the courts and parlia-
ment.8 He is not, however, ultimately persuaded. In a chapter focusing on
'[t]he native appeal courts and customary law', he writes:
In a society dominated by racist politics, and racially inspired public policy
and legislation, the private law and the high courts have often been seen
as essentially only racist when explicitly forced to be by a sovereign legisla-
ture. However both the supreme courts and those special higher courts that
dealt with African cases were crucial to the elaboration of a differentiated
and segregated law [that is, to a law for blacks that was separate from the
law for whites], and contributed both to the crushing of an assimilative
legal liberalism [that would have moved toward one law for all races] and
to the elaboration of a restrictive and authoritarian style of customary law
[a separate law for blacks] based on differential racial capacities. (29 1)4
As that comment suggests, it simply does not appear to be the case
that South Africa's Supreme Court judges - let alone the magistrates
below them - fell short only when forced to by legislation.5 Chanock
reports a number of decisions on race-related issues that do not appear
compelled by statutory language, and indeed that seem to owe a good deal
to the judges' personal racial feelings. He notes the 'prejudiced remarks'
judges sometimes uttered (though he emphasises that 'what is involved is
more than just these remarks'). 6 For instance, one of South Africa's Chief
Justices, Wessels CJ, wrote in a 1933 decision that:
In punishing them [Africans] we must remember that they are not civilised
Europeans but kaffirs living more or less in a state of nature and when they
act according to their natural and inherited impulses they do not deserve
to be punished too severely as if they were civilised Europeans dwelling in
a city or village.7
So, too, in an immigration case, the Appellate Division upheld the govern-
ment's prohibition of immigration by 'every Asiatic person' under a statute
which allowed the minister to bar 'any person or class of persons deemed
by the minister on economic grounds or on account of standard or habits
of life to be unsuited to the requirements of the Union'. One member of
the court, Solomon JA, explained why even Asian professionals could be
barred:
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A 'person of that [professional] class', Solomon reasoned, 'exercising
influence over his fellow Asiatic, may become a disturbing factor in the
industrial processes of the country, as actually happened in the now historic
case of Gandhi. 8
Nor were these cases unique.9
But no one can deny that there were judicial decisions that protected
rights, even rights of blacks and of blacks opposed to the state. I do not
question the sincerity or the courage of these decisions, nor do I take
Chanock to do so. Chanock observes at one point:
It could be argued that in the first decades of the twentieth century South
African judges were, even in the circumstances of a strongly contested
political order, and the highly politicised nature of many of the appellate
cases, bolder in their defence of some of the 'liberties of the subject' than
their English counterparts. (507)
What Chanock presses us to do, however, is to ask what else, besides
personal virtue and professional fidelity to principle, might have been at
work.
Once that question is asked, we must recognise that it is a good one.
Judges, no matter how principled and independent, live in the same world
as their fellow human beings, and they are as shaped by that world as
everyone else. The judges of South Africa, virtuous and principled as they
may have been, lived in their world and responded to it. They were people,
and to call a person an 'upright judge' may well be appropriate but it is
never complete: a person is more complex, and more shaded, than the
simple, though important, idea of an 'upright judge' can convey.
In the world in which South African judges lived and judged, what
functions did decisions that upheld legal rights play? One answer is that
they achieved a measure of the rule of law, and that is no small feat, as
Hugh Corder reminds us.10 Indeed, rightly deciding particular cases is
most of what judges do to contribute to their society being a just one.
But while that answer is correct, it is incomplete. Chanock's analysis
challenges us to consider other, less benign functions as well. In what
follows I partly rely directly on Chanock's study, but I also try to accept
his invitation to think more freely about what virtue may be about in
the midst of injustice. Here are several possibilities, which begin with
what might be called negative functions (guilt and denial) and move on
to more affirmative processes (identity-building, protection of whites, and
legitimation):
Guilt: I wonder whether judges who were authorising so much
injustice to so many felt a special impetus to protect justice where
they could. When I studied the decisions of the Appellate Division
under Rabie CJ (later Rabie ACJ) during the state of emergency in
the 1980s, I felt that I encountered a similar phenomenon: the most
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important cases were decided in favour of the government, but not
every case, and in those that went against the government I saw the
possibility that:
For judges who sought to harmonize their determination to protect the
emergency order with their fidelity to law, the sense that these two
goals were in tension would have been disquieting indeed. Perhaps it
is just such disquiet that helps explain the alacrity of the Rabie court's
response ... where it could, without undercutting the fundamental
features of the emergency system, once again vindicate the integrity of
the law. (Ellmann, 1992: 204)
Denial: In being careful about the rights of whites and sometimes
those of blacks, judges could look away from the system of command
and discretion that they were helping install for blacks. They spoke,
one might say, only of what could be spoken of. Thus Chanock points
to the technical reasoning of the Detody case, which read an inclu-
sively worded pass law not to require passes for African women, and
suggests that the judges focused on legal fine points because pass
law policy was too fraught for discussion. " More broadly, Chanock
says that the bench came to be 'dedicated more to the elaboration
of a distinctive South African private law than to playing a part
in the making of the South African polity'. In that role, the judges
were 'increasingly immune from the vituperative criticism they had
earlier attracted'.1 2 And perhaps the motive was not just to steer
clear of controversy and criticism, but to avoid thinking about the
unthinkable - as a mining engineer did when he told an investigatory
commission: "'I do not dare to think about what is happening among
the Kafirs", whose work is "far more dangerous" than that of the
whites'. (192)
Identity-building: Chanock emphasises the importance white society
attached to affirming the contrast between civilised, enlightened
white justice and the primitive despotism and ungoverned violence
whites chose to discern in customary law and African communities.
Describing a case involving a debt secured by a pledge of oxen,
Chanock points to the 'determination of the judges to develop and
display the fully flowering jurisprudence of the Roman-Dutch law'. 3
He goes on:
As an exercise in scholarship it can be read with pleasure. But it
should also be read with incredulity if one asks why Carpzovius' 'Law
of Saxony' or the rescripts of the emperor Severus could have been
applied to Mapenduka's oxen. Neither Hutton [the trial court judge] nor
the appellate judges had any thought for the concepts of right and law
which might have been in the minds of the litigants ... The narrative
here is one of 'whose law', and the court was making very clear that it
was not Africa's.14
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Even decisions that in an immediate sense might have been contrary
to many whites' interests - and there is no reason to assume that
most private law decisions were contrary to whites' interests - could,
from a broader perspective, help justify the broad structure of white
rule. Chanock writes that 'the higher courts were refiners of the
definitions of self and otherness' (129), and that the judges of the
Supreme Courts:
In a feat of self-imagining ... saw themselves as brothers to Grotius
and the Master of the Rolls rather than to the farm foreman and the
prison warder ... This legal identity not only helped evasion of South
African actualities, but constructed a philosophical, juristic, correct
and formal self which could be opposed totally to the barbarian other.
(130)
(Ironically, of course, the labour of black South Africans provided the
basis for the country's economic strength, which made any set of legal
rules easier to live by. 15) Chanock concludes:
Excluded increasingly from the political realm by frequent bruising
public criticism and executive determination, the judiciary's prestige
and independence were developed in the core areas of common law, in
which they were granted a wide degree of latitude. This was an integral
part of the development of white cultural nationalism, taken up with
renewed vigour when nationalist-minded judges finally took control of
the appellate courts in the 1950s and 1960s. (527)
Protection of whites: Chanock points to a number of fields of law in
which special judicial vigilance reflected, he suggests, that whites
were directly affected. Ofjudicial limits on the liquor prohibition laws,
he writes that:
Many in the target population of the law, blacks who wanted to consume
alcohol, were caught by simple police action, or in the lower courts
where convictions and punishments were handed out in a routine and
administrative style barely encumbered by the Supreme Courts' legal-
isms. The purpose of the [Supreme Courts'] patrol [of 'the boundaries
of the state's policing and punitive powers'] was to ensure that state
actions did not spill over and completely engulf the wrong targets, in
this case a class of offenders produced by a criminalising statute who
were mainly white. (126-7).
He goes on to apply a similar analysis to judicial decisions under
political offence statutes such as the Riotous Assemblies Act, and 'the
provisions of the Masters and Servants Act which criminalised entic-
ing workers away from a particular employer' (127).
The impact, for blacks, of such legal protections as existed was
further diminished by their limited access to legal representation.
Chanock notes that:
Those [whites] who were closest to the administration of justice to those
living in the African reserves and who were under African customary
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law, were mostly of the view that lawyers simply served to undermine
the prestige of the courts and the magistrates, and that their activities
were contrary to the inherent African belief in unchallenged despotic
power. (234)
In a number of situations, moreover, white policy - or at least white
office-holders - deliberately avoided informing Africans of the legal
rights they theoretically enjoyed. 16
Legitimation: Chanock also feels, as it seems the government did, that
the existence of an independent, admired judiciary 'lent a non-political
prestige to the enforcement of the now routinely discriminatory
statute law' (508). It is certainly possible to question whether those
subject to such law were more likely to obey it because of its supposed
legitimacy, but it still seems likely that those making and enforcing
the law wanted to see their acts as legitimate (Ellmann, 1992: 178 &
n 76). Chanock writes that:
For the politicians the appearance of correctness which the growing
formalism gave to the careful but unquestioned judicial enforcement
of the statute law was a small price to pay for the acknowledgement of
judicial independence in carrying out this role. (508)
We might infer that this exchange was not altogether unconscious for
the judges either. Their role would be especially problematic to the
extent that they understood that their benign statements functioned
as window-dressing. Chanock observes that 'quotable dicta tend to
live on as emblematic', even when the actual course of decisions is less
exalted. 17 He writes as well that 'a display of the limited repertoire
of liberal legal dicta from cases past should not be allowed to distort
the picture of the racial foundations and purposes of South Africa's
law' (530). Meanwhile, of course, law - with its sheen of legitimacy
- provided a crucial resource for whites' daily rule over blacks. As
Chanock observes in discussing 'master and servant legislation':
In a society with an endowment from the previous rulers of judicial
institutions, officials could not act without law. They needed law to
carry out their functions and ambitions and to authorize the enlarge-
ment of their sphere of control. Without it there could not be the detailed
control of the social order that they wanted. Law did not so much control
the administrators as authorise and empower them. (428)
The climax of this development was the enactment of the Native
Administration Act of 1927, whose 'crucial feature' was '[g]overnment
by proclamation under the Governor-General as supreme chief, which
finally placed Africans beyond the "rule of law" in the constitutional
sense' (281).
The upshot is something that on reflection should not be surprising: a
society pervaded by racial injustice is a society pervaded, really pervaded,
by racial injustice. Chanock speaks of 'coming to terms with Maitland's
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idea that all of the parts of law are interrelated' (28). There will not be any
areas of purity, because everyone knows, at least roughly, that something
very different is happening in the next room down. That their knowledge
of what is happening in other rooms may be incomplete and euphemistic
is itself one implicit function of even benign law in a deeply unjust state.
What Should Be Done About It Now?
The fact that an institution or a practice has repellent roots does not,
by itself, mean that that institution should be abandoned - unless one
believes that abandonment is a necessary punishment for past injustice.
Probably few people do think that, however. What most of us want to
know is what the right thing is to do now, for the people living now and
for those to come in the future. That requires a different kind of inquiry.
As Chanock puts it:
How far can the existing practices and meanings stretch? ... [H]ow far can
they continue to be usable as a part of a fundamental rejection of the order
of which they were a part? (524)
This is a very hard inquiry. As difficult as it is to understand the past
- in Chanock's words, '[a]s the present changed, so did the past' (xi) - still
the task of charting a course today is even more challenging, because it is
very hard for us to know what historical moment we are part of before it is
already over. Still, this is the job - our job, but also the job of all those, not
least Constitutional Court judges, who seek to help build the new state.
I want to start by sketching what would be involved in a thoroughgoing
disestablishment of the institution of judging that Chanock demonstrates
was shaped profoundly by racial considerations. Let us approach this task
as a thought experiment, but I should emphasise that this utter abolition
is not what Chanock calls for - rather, I want to make this effort in order
to think about what Chanock's analysis might suggest we should call for.
What might be disestablished, if we set out to abolish all aspects of
judging that were shaped by race? Here is an answer: we would not only
have needed to discharge the judges of the old order, but also to overturn
the very institution of an independent, objective judiciary, an elite body
carefully distanced from the larger society, whose scholarly, unemotional
exposition of the dictates of justice and of law merited acknowledgment
as one of the achievements of the old South Africa.
Chanock might characterise the institution differently. He focuses
on the word 'formalism', and emphasises that the period he is studying
'produce [d] a model of judges divorced from "politics", yet attached to "law".
This could only mean an entrenchment of the literal style of formalism'
(515). This particular mode of adjudication may be characteristic ofjudici-
aries seeking to fend off the wishes of more or less inarticulate legislators
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and executives, as Chanock suggests (518). I do not think, however, that
literalism is integral to the existence of an elite, independent judiciary,
and South African statutory interpretation in fact included a number
of non-literalist moves in the judicial repertoire - sometimes employing
them in the defence of common law rights. 18 1 do not resist Chanock's
use of the term 'formalism', but I would call the entire apparatus of the
austere, independent judiciary, engaged in determination of outcomes
through the application of a highly rationalised and complex logical proc-
ess, a formalism.
So what would it take to end this? There are a number of steps that
would need to be taken, and many of them have in fact been taken. A
significant part of the development of the new South Africa's legal system
has been a tempering of the most hierarchical, elitist and technical aspects
of judging as it had been practiced in the old order.
Some of these changes are stylistic (and style does matter). The
Constitutional Court, in particular, has paid close attention to these
concerns, though it may be that lower courts remain less re-cast. It is
no accident that a lawyer addressing the Constitutional Court faces the
judges roughly at eye level, rather than having to lift her eyes to address
the judge on an elevated bench. (It remains true, however, that the lawyer
stands, while the judges sit; not all hierarchy of design has been removed.)
The robes worn by the justices of the Constitutional Court are not the
robes of the old order, and instead echo in part the colours of the new flag. 19
The court's building, famously and beautifully, embodies and reclaims the
remains of a notorious apartheid jail. Its remarkable art invites visitors,
sometimes in quite difficult and unsettling ways, to engage emotionally
rather than just intellectually with South Africa's quest for justice.20
Other changes are entirely, and profoundly, substantive. The
Constitution unmistakably and emphatically declares the new values of
the nation,21 and the Constitutional Court has made clear that all law
must be based on the Constitution.22 Law is henceforward value-based
rather than fundamentally a subject for technical exegesis (Ellmann, 2009:
107-9). The Constitution rejects the idea of law as unfettered bureaucratic
discretion and command (though that certainly does not mean that all
officials honour the law's requirements).23 The law of all South Africans is
now honoured, as customary law has become both protected and regulated
by the Constitution.24 And the judges themselves, in their public interviews
before the Judicial Service Commission as part of their consideration for
appointment, can be asked to declare their own constitutional values.25
Surely it is fair to say that the judiciary is in the process of being remade,
in part around adherence to the new order's values (or some version of
them).
There may be more that should be done. Chanock discusses a return
to forms of lay participation in judgment, 26 and certainly observers from
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countries that embrace trial by jury can see the potential value of such
steps, which reduce the degree to which judging is actually the exclusive
province of elite judges. Chanock also emphasises the need to attend to
a wider range of voices than just those of judges in shaping the law. He
writes:
[f]n spite of the increase in judicial power around the world as new consti-
tutional states spread and the discovery of 'rule of law' and 'governance'
issues become [s] a part of the language of globalisation, the judicial voice,
even when it rises to inspiring heights, cannot alone bear the burden of
envisioning the new legal order. (537)
This idea too will resonate with those who see the importance of a 'consti-
tutional culture' for the strength of a constitutional state.
But what about the stance of objectivity itself? Chanock at one point
cites, seemingly with approval, an argument made in the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission hearings 'that what was needed was "to break
the tradition of distanced judging in our society"' (535). He also asks:
Can there be a formalism without the claim of legal professionals to control
validity in reasoning about law? ... There will be obvious fears for a 'rule of
law' if the narrow claim to control the definition of law is abandoned, and
the danger of the possible rejection of law if it is maintained. (534)
But I would not read these suggestions to call for an end to objectivity. I
have argued elsewhere that even when we recognise, as we should, that
constitutional judges' values and emotions are an integral part of their
judging - so that they are not 'distanced' - we can and should still value
the goal of objectivity (Ellmann, 2009: 131-7). So, too, it is quite possible
to understand constitutional (and other) judging as interacting with the
values of a society, as those values are shaped over time in the society's
culture as a whole - so that judges do not autonomously 'contror the
definition of law - without saying that what judges should do is simply to
take the pulse of the people and then announce it.
South Africa's Constitutional Court still holds to the goal of judgment
without 'fear, favour or prejudice', most notably in the Thint case, which
involved a tangle of issues around potential criminal charges against
Jacob Zuma, now South Africa's president. 27 This is a goal that human
beings cannot perfectly achieve, but if we really seek to disestablish the
old formalism we would abandon this formalist goal. We would then not
seek to judge without fear, favour or prejudice. Presumably we would
also not seek in any measure to characterise judicial appointments as
nonpolitical. And we would no longer value the particular stance of inde-
pendence from the executive (and for that matter from parliament). There
would, then, be no base from which to criticise the appointment of the
most executive-minded of judges.
So, too, there would be an end to literal interpretation. But equally
an end to values-based interpretation or purposive interpretation: each
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of these is inescapably an elaborate structure of reasoning and argument.
Each also involves some measure of judicial authority over other voices -
to my mind an element of formalism - in ascertaining the true meaning
of constitutional values, for instance, or in discerning the purposes that
will support departure from what might otherwise appear to be the literal
meaning of a legal text being applied. Could we dispense with all such
forms of interpretive expertise, or with the ultimate prerogative of the
courts to employ them more or less authoritatively?
28
Indeed, we would need to give up the idea of the judges as experts,
with special ability to discern the meaning of law from study of more or
less arcane texts. In the period Chanock's book covers, the texts were those
of Roman-Dutch authorities, but today's judges study international or
comparative law materials, some of them in languages few South Africans
can read. It is not easy to think of how we would disestablish this, and the
fact that it is not easy is important. Do we want judges to be less learned?
Or less thoughtful in their decision making? Or to disregard the lessons
they might derive from consulting those obscure and inaccessible sources?
Or to disavow, as pretensions, claims to a deeper insight into constitutional
values than politicians possess, or a more fundamental authority to rule
on such matters? Or simply to step back from constitutional adjudication
altogether? We might accomplish all this by saying that the meaning of
legal terms is no more and no less than what South Africans say that it is
(however we would determine what they are saying). But at that point, as
Alice learned, the issue of meaning is just the question of who is master
(Carroll, 1871: 213).
I hope I have managed to show that completely disestablishing the
elitist judiciary would involve removing crucial elements of what South
Africans, and citizens of many other nations around the world, now regard
as essential to the protection of their rights. Perhaps all this should be
disestablished, as a thoroughgoing advocate of 'popular constitutionalism'
might urge, but that strikes me as a very rash gamble. 29 I acknowledge
that we cannot simply assert as a fact that reliance on courts to play this
protective role is in the end better than reliance on other parts of govern-
ment, or on the mobilised people themselves - but the very difficulty of
assessing such vast institutional questions to my mind counsels broadly
in favour of preserving the judicial function we have evolved.30 To this
extent, I believe we should all be formalists now.
On this ground, I think the lawyers' desire to maintain legal continuity
as part of the constitutional transition from apartheid was well-founded
- even when we recognise, as Chanock shows us, just how flawed an
enterprise even the best of the old legal order was. Chanock himself writes
that 'without the centrality of formalism a state cannot be based on a "rule
of law"' (512). He is against an 'uncompromising formalism' (535) and he
feels that the new formalism of rights needs to become 'less exclusive and
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less absolutist', (534) but as I read him, he is concerned to maintain the
integrity of the process and judgments of the courts at the same time, and
to figure out how that can be done.
Thus I think the goal should be to reduce the pretensions of the
judiciary - in ways that the Constitutional Court has already sought to
do - while maintaining what might be called its formalist core, that is,
its claim to a special expertise and responsibility in interpreting law and
protecting rights. This course is better than total disestablishment (if
that is even conceivable) because we do not sacrifice an institution that
provides some security for rights and that required the work of centuries
to establish.
It is also better because it may help us avoid another peril: a turn
by society to unprincipled manipulations of the ideals of the past. In the
United States, the Republican Party long after the Civil War 'waved the
bloody shirt' - bloodied in the course of the Union's effort to deal with
postwar Southern resistance - to maintain its political power even as the
rights of the freed slaves were abridged almost to extinction.31 In South
Africa, it is not impossible that resentment of whites will similarly be
employed by a self-serving elite no longer mindful of the Constitution's
humane and egalitarian aspirations. We can at least hope that a judiciary
still embracing the task of giving meaning to law will somewhat undercut
such distortions, although in a direct clash between judges and politicians,
judges do not have the stronger hand - and there are already troubling
signs of political pressure being mobilised against the courts. 3 2 As Chanock
also observes:
[T]here is much sense in separating internal professional legal discourses
from discourses about law as their categories and ways of reasoning can
be, and have often been in the South African case, not only very different
but also more just. But one needs to do this without forgetting, and when
necessary exhuming, the relationship between the discourses internal to
law, and those about law. (526)
In short, I think it is essential not to wage unlimited war on formal-
ism; that is yesterday's battle. Instead, what we need is to find new ways
to make adjudication stronger and wiser. And, borrowing one of Chanock's
central lessons - that law is not spoken about just by courts, but by other
political actors and the society as a whole33 - we need to find ways to
produce a politics that is stronger and wiser as well.
The Constitutional Court has taken a number of steps that point in
this direction. Its cases requiring engagement between municipalities and
people facing eviction give courts more direct access to the concrete needs
and wishes of people, and ensure that administrators encounter them as
well (for example Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 2008). Its cases on parlia-
ment's obligation to make space for public participation may deepen the
extent to which members of parliament encounter, and represent, their
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constituents (for example Merafong, 2008).14 Its welcome of customary
law reforming itself clearly aims to foster a lived constitutionalism in
customary communities (Shilubana, 2009). The Court's use of its author-
ity to suspend the application of its constitutional judgments, and to grant
Parliament time to decide how to rewrite unconstitutional laws the court
has identified, also seeks to enlist the political branches of the country
in the task of giving constitutional values meaning.35 So too the Court's
recent articulation of a constitutional duty to establish an independent
anti-corruption body is a striking effort to bind politics by law (Glenister,
2011), as is its decision that the statute permitting the president to extend
the term of the court's own Chief Justice was unconstitutional (Justice
Alliance, 2011).
But wisdom in politics requires even more than a sincere knowledge
of constitutional values. It is all too easy to encounter the world through
structures of preconception so firm that much that is expressed goes unac-
knowledged. Chanock made this reality apparent in his book on customary
law, in which he incisively demonstrated that assertions of what was
traditional and customary were constructed to meet contemporary anxi-
eties and objectives. 3 6 Similarly, at our conference in Cape Town, Aninka
Claassens and Sindiso Mnisi emphasised the many ways that women were
rearticulating the requirements of customary law, ways that departed
from the supposed dictates of past tradition (see Claassens and Mnisi
2009: 499-502). The point, however, is not only to hear voices that might
in the past have been disregarded. Each voice must be heard, with respect
but not credulity. George Orwell once wrote that he:
had reduced everything to the simple theory that the oppressed are always
right and the oppressors are always wrong: a mistaken theory, but the
natural result of being one of the oppressors yourself. (Orwell, 1958: 180)
If the courts are to listen, and to help shape a country in which other
government actors also listen, then perhaps what South Africa needs
is not to beware of formalism but to beware of formulas. Let us seek a
constitution of no slogans, in which courts - continuing their historic role
of providing a measure of independent judgment about society - deepen
their contribution by being as sensitive as possible to the entitlements,
and imperfections, of all who come before them.
Notes
I appreciate the comments of two anonymous reviewers, as well as discussions
at the conference in honour of Martin Chanock, at which I first presented
these ideas.
1 Page citations in the text and endnotes are to this volume unless otherwise
indicated.
2 South Africa today wrestles with the challenges of accommodating differ-
ent racial or religious communities' distinctive laws within an overarching
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democratic order. That can be a perplexing task - but 'dealing with differ-
ence' in this way is far from the enterprise of domination-by-differentiation
that characterised the old South Africa.
3 For an example of a judicial decision 'conclud[ing] with the customary
expression of regret' and urging legislative reform - which was subsequently
accomplished - see Chanock, 2001: 421 (discussing Hashe v Cape Town
Municipality 1927 AD 380); and for an example of a judicial decision restrict-
ing rural whites' power over squatters, a decision that prompted a 'white
rural outcry [that] led to a swift statutory response', see Chanock, 2001: 425
(discussing Maynard v Chasana 1921 TPD 243).
4 On whites' perception and shaping of African institutions, Chanock writes:
Drawing upon the prevailing images in white South African society, both
courts and legislatures in the early twentieth century fashioned an African
institution to fit not only the administrative needs of the state but also the
symbolic needs of white discourses, legal and general, about the nature
of African political institutions. The definition of the chiefs powers in the
courts was part of the process by which Africans were placed, justly and
reasonably, and according to their own ways, beyond the scope of associa-
tion with political democracy and the rule of law. (283)
5 Chanock comments that '[m]agistrates' courts, like lower courts everywhere,
delivered a sort of administered law, and were less concerned about the
niceties of interpretation than the higher courts were' (119). Later he
characterises 'the lower courts' as 'agencies through which labour and other
disciplines could be imposed' (128).
6 Chanock, 2001: 128, quoting Corder, 1984: 132.
7 R v Xulu 1933 AD 197 at 200, quoted in Chanock, 2001: 129.
8 Chanock, 2001: 504, and at 505 quoting R v Padsha 1923 AD 281 at 288-9
(judgment of Solomon JA).
9 Chanock, 2001: 499-501 (discussing other cases). See also at 321, discussing
R v Msweli 1911 NHC 64. The case, as Chanock explains it, was about the
brutal killing of a white farmer's wife, a crime committed by the son of an
African chief in response to the farmer's cutting down trees surrounding the
grave of the accused's father, who was buried on the farmer's land. Chanock
quotes the uncomprehending words with which the judge, Boshoff J, began
his decision, 1911 NHC at 64:
In spite of the most earnest missionary and educational effort, the native
population of this Province still continues to contribute largely to the
criminology of this country. One feels irresistibly driven to ask oneself the
question: What can be done, if not to obliterate, certainly to mitigate these
terrible evils?
10 Corder, 2012: 70.
11 Chanock, 2001: 506-7, discussing R v Detody 1926 AD 198.
12 Chanock, 2001: 508. Earlier, 'one of the features of South African legal
culture in the first decades was the intensity of public criticism of the courts'
(517).
13 Chanock, 2001: 14, discussing Mapenduka v Ashington 1919 AD 343.
14 Chanock, 2001: 15. Chanock says of Roman-Dutch law, in particular, that
'[niothing could be more demonstrably different from the customs of savages.
In a sense the Roman-Dutch law embodied the capacity to be civilised' (166).
15 Sometimes the connection between deprivation of blacks' rights and mainte-
nance of pure legal rules for whites may have been even more direct. Chanock
writes that 'cutting down non-white access to land was one way of seeming to
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ensure white access. It could be done this way without sacrificing any of the
ideological attachment to the rights of ownership, and raising ugly debates
about the distribution of ownership within the white community' (370).
16 Chanock notes that 'no steps were taken to inform Africans of their [statu-
tory] rights' to compensation for phthisis, a disease of the mines (195).
Similarly, he reports a statement by a white official 'that although he had in
law no authority to apply African law, nor to act as a court, he did so without
legal sanction "by judicious bluff" and, in Chanock's words, 'asserting an
administrative prerogative to ignore the law' that permitted women to go
to towns 'on their own' (276-7). So, too, Chanock describes the unmentioned
legal right of black miners to leave the mines' 'closed compounds' where they
lived (433-4).
17 Chanock, 2001: 503, n 5. In similar vein, Chanock describes the stance of the
distinguished judge Sir James Rose-Innes about review of administrative
agencies: 'a story marked by wide dicta asserting the scope and power of
review, combined with a narrower reluctance actually to exercise the powers
claimed' (480).
18 I discussed modes of South African statutory interpretation at some length in
Ellmann, 1992: 26-56 (chapter on 'Hurley's Case and the Doctrinal Basis for
Human Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa'). There (at 43), I pointed to R
v Detody 1926 AD 198, as an example of a contextualist rather than literal-
ist decision favouring human rights claims - though Chanock emphasises
the technical character of the judges' arguments, and it is striking that the
majority justices reach their conclusion, narrowing the reading of a pass
law so that it exempted African women, with little if any reference to the
burden on liberty that the pass laws might represent. I also looked closely
at the much later case of Minister of Law and Order v Hurley 1986 (3) SA
549 (A), which invoked a canon of interpretation favouring judicial review
to minimise the impact of statutory language that at first blush appeared to
'oust' the jurisdiction of the courts, see Ellmann, 1992: 50-3.
19 Rickard describes the 'long, green black-buttoned gowns with black waist
sash and white lace neck frill, robes which were specially designed for them
and were first worn when the Court was formally sworn in on 14 February
1995', in Rickard 2001: 232. Green and black are two of the colours of post-
apartheid South Africa's flag. See South African Government Information,
'National Flag' at <www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/symbols/flag.htm> (accessed
27 March 2012).
20 See generally Law-Viljoen nd [2006], and Law-Viljoen, 2008.
21 Section 1 of South Africa's Constitution, adopted in 1996, declares:
The Republic of South Africa is one sovereign, democratic state founded on
the following values:
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advance-
ment of human rights and freedoms.
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism.
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure
accountability, responsiveness and openness.
22 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex Parte President
of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44.
23 Constitution, s 35 (constitutional right to'[j]ust administrative action').
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24 Constitution, s 211(3) ('The courts must apply customary law when that law
is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically
deals with customary law').
25 For the constitutional role of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), see
Constitution, s 93. The transcripts of the JSC hearings of a number of the
justices on the Constitutional Court are available on the court's website
as links from the biographies of the justices; for example, the 1999 JSC
interview of Sandile Ngcobo, who went on to serve as Chief Justice of
South Africa, is at <www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/transcripts/
ngokobo.html> (last accessed 4 February 2012; "Ngcobo" is misspelled in
the URL). Perhaps Chief Justice Ngcobo's most striking comment in this
interview was his response to a question about what court he would most
like to serve on; his first words were that 'I have come to realise over the
years that my interests are somewhat irrelevant in this country because of
the responsibility that one has as a black person', specifically to contribute
to meeting the constitutional mandate that 'the judiciary must be broadly
reflective of the race and gender composition of South Africa' (transcript at
8).
26 Chanock points to 'many obvious things to be thought about if a version of
formal liberal law is this time to be more successful. Some are already in
process: a lower-court system not entirely dominated by public officials; a
return to forms of lay participation in judgment; a less remote Bar; a less
exalted judiciary more widely chosen; a more comprehensible and accessible
common law; different forms of legal practice' (535).
27 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (1) SA (1)
(CC), para 6. I discuss this aspect of Thint in Ellmann, 2009: 129-31.
28 I say 'more or less' because I do not think that a commitment to judicial
enforcement of constitutional provisions must be absolutist. A system such
as Canada's (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: s 33) that permits
explicit, time-limited legislative override of judicial decisions can be one
that leaves the courts' role still highly authoritative. There is certainly
room for argument, within the general framework of affirmation of judicial
constitutionalism, over just how sweeping judicial authority needs to be.
29 Or perhaps even the most ardent popular constitutionalists, while prepared
to dispense with judicial review of constitutional questions or with the ulti-
mate supremacy of judicial determinations, would still preserve a judiciary
that, though diminished, remained formalistic. We might imagine a return
to Diceyan constitutionalism, in which courts vigorously scrutinise and
circumscribe legislative action, while the legislature retains the authority
to override all the courts' limits if it is prepared to do that.
30 Two American scholars, one an advocate of 'popular constitutionalism' and
one a critic, both describe a formidable range of issues that would have to
be compassed in order to compare, empirically, the constitutional perform-
ance of courts, other branches of government, or popular mobilisations:
see Tushnet, 2006: 1001-5; Chemerinsky, 2004. Another leading American
advocate of popular constitutionalism has argued that the inclination to
resolve these uncertainties in favour of judicial supremacy fundamentally
reflects distrust of the people: Kramer, 2004: 1001-8. I would put the point
differently, and maintain that all power, including popular power, needs to
be checked.
31 Garaty writes that '[t]his dead horse was beaten repeatedly to distract
northern voters from the inadequacies of Republican candidates' while
'Republicans repeatedly dealt in the most cynical manner possible with the
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only meaningful question related to sectional animosity: the treatment of
Negroes in the southern states' (Garaty, 1968: 241). For the judicial contribu-
tion to these events, see Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896).
32 Bizos, 2011; Corder, 2012: [72-3]. For cogent defences of the courts' role as
part of South African democracy, see Budlender, 2011; Chaskalson, 2012;
O'Regan, 2011.
33 Chanock writes in his preface that 'law ... is, like any complex cultural activ-
ity, always in the process of making, of contemporary creation ... [f]n this
making there was no authoritative rule-producing voice but a multiplicity
of voices and dialogues both within and outside the state' (xii).
34 Bishop insightfully discusses this case, and the 'engagement' cases, in
Bishop, 2009.
35 See for example Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 542 (CC). The
court's rule that where a statute has been enacted to implement a consti-
tutional command, a lawsuit about that constitutional area must proceed
under the statute rather than directly under the Constitution unless the
statute itself is being challenged, is also an effort to vindicate parliament's
role in constitutional interpretation. South African National Defence Union
v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) at para 51.
36 Chanock, 1998. He writes in this volume:
The law was the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the power of
an alien state and part of the process of coercion. And it also came to be a
new way of conceptualising relationships and powers and a weapon within
African communities which were undergoing basic economic changes, many
of which were interpreted and fought over by those involved in moral terms.
The customary law, far from being a survival, was created by these changes
and conflicts. (4)
References
Bishop, M (2009) 'Vampire or Prince? The Listening Constitution and Merafong
Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa' 2
Constitutional Court Review 313.
Bizos, G (2011) 'Blame Neither the Constitution Nor the Courts' (address delivered
at Spring Graduation Ceremony, University of Pretoria, 9 December 2011),
available at <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/centre-news-2012/929-
presentation-of-honorary-doctorate-to-george-bizos -sc,html>.
Budlender, G (2011) 'People's Power and the Courts, Bram Fischer Memorial
Lecture, 2011' 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 582.
Carroll, L (1871) Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There in L
Carroll The Annotated Alice: Definitive Edition (Martin Gardner (ed) (2000)).
New York and London: WW Norton.
Chanock, M (1998) Law, Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in
Malawi and Zambia. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann (reissue; original publi-
cation 1985).
Chanock, M (2001) The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear,
Favour and Prejudice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chaskalson, A(2012)'Without Fear, FavourorPrejudice: The Courts, the Constitution
and Transformation", available at <http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/
former-chief-justice-arthur-chaskalson-without-fear-favour-or-prejudice-
the-courts -the -constitution-and-transformation/>.
LEARNING FROM THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE
Chemerinsky, E (2004), 'In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism' 2004 University of Illinois Law Review 673.
Claassens, A and S Mnisi (2009), 'Rural Women Redefining Land Rights in the
Context of Living Customary Law' 25 South African Journal on Human
Rights 491.
Constitutional Court of South Africa (1999), 'Interview with Justice SS Ngcobo,
April 1999' available at <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/
transcripts/ngokobo.html>.
Corder, H (1984) Judges at Work. Johannesburg: Juta.
Corder, H (2012) "'Building a Nation": The Judicial Role in South Africa', this
volume.
Ellmann, S (1992) In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State
of Emergency. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ellmann, S (2009) 'Marking the Path of the Law' 2 Constitutional Court Review 97.
Garaty, J (1968) The New Commonwealth 1877-1890. New York, Evanston and
London: Harper & Row.
Kramer, L (2004) 'Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004' 92 California Law
Review 959.
Law-Viljoen, B (ed) (nd [2006]), Light on a Hill: Building the Constitutional Court
of South Africa. Parkwood: David Krut Publishing.
Law-Viljoen, B (ed) (2008) Art and Justice: The Art of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa. Parkwood: David Krut Publishing.
O'Regan, C (2011) 'A Forum for Reason: Reflections on the Role and Work
of the Constitutional Court' (Helen Suzman Memorial Lecture,
2011) available at <http://writingrights.nu.org.za/2011/11/24/
justice-kate-oregans-helen-suzman-memorial-lecture/>.
Orwell, G (1958) The Road to Wigan Pier. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
Rickard, C (2001) 'The Certification of the Constitution of South Africa' in P
Andrews and S Ellmann (eds) The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives
on South Africa's Basic Law. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press
and Athens (Ohio): Ohio University Press.
South African Government Information (2012), 'National Flag', available at
<www.info. gov. za/aboutgovt/symbols/flag.htm>.
Tushnet, M (2006) 'Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law' 81 Chicago-Kent
Law Review 991.
Cases
Glenister and President of the Republic of South Africa, In the Matter Between
2011 (3) SA 347 (CC)
Hashe v Cape Town Municipality 1927 AD 380
Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011
(5) SA 388 (CC)
Mapenduka v Ashington 1919 AD 343
Maynard v Chasana 1921 TPD 243
Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008
(5) SA 171 (CC)
Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC)
Minister of Law and Order v Hurley1986 (3) SA 549 (A)
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC)
FOR MARTIN CHANOCK ESSAYS ON LAW AND SOCIETY
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA; In re Ex Parte President of the
Republic of South Africa 2002 (2) SA 674 (CC)
Plessy v Ferguson 163 US 537 (1896)
R v Detody 1926 AD 198
R v Msweli 1911 NHC 64
R v Padsha 1923 AD 281
R v Xulu 1933 AD 197
Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC)
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC)
Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2009 (1) SA (1) (CC)
Legislation
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act (UK), 1982, c 11
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 108 of 1996
